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This report outlines the WRC’s findings and recommendations regarding labor rights 
compliance at the Confecciones Mazara apparel factory. The factory is located in the City 
of Tehuacán in the State of Puebla in Southern Mexico.  
 
The Confecciones Mazara factory was disclosed by Williamson-Dickie Corporation to 
the WRC and the City of Los Angeles as a manufacturer of goods sold by Williamson-
Dickie to the City.  As such, the facility is covered by the City’s Sweat-Free Procurement 
Ordinance. The WRC conducted an investigation at Confecciones Mazara, pursuant to 
our role as the monitor contracted by the City to verify compliance with the Ordinance.  
 
The WRC undertook the investigation in response to a complaint from an NGO in 
Tehuacán known as the Human and Labor Rights Commission of the Tehuacán Valley. 
The complaint alleged that the Confecciones Mazara plant had discriminated, in its hiring 
process, against job applicants who had previously worked at a factory known as 
Vaqueros Navarra and who had participated in, or were believed to have participated in, 
trade union activism at that factory. Such discrimination is known colloquially as 
“blacklisting.”  
 
The WRC’s inquiry found strong evidence in support of the conclusion that the 
Confecciones Mazara plant engaged in blacklisting. The factory subjected workers 
applying for employment to a series of screening mechanisms that had the intent and the 
effect of excluding union sympathizers from potential employment. The blacklisting of 
workers for trade union activism represents a violation of Mexican law and therefore 
violates the requirements of the City’s Sweat-Free Ordinance.   
 
The WRC also conducted an onsite inspection of the factory with respect to occupational 
health and safety (OHS). We identified problems including a lack of protective 
equipment on sewing machines, lack of adequate and sanitary rest room facilities, and a 
lack of readily accessible and clearly marked first aid kits.  
 
In light of these findings, the WRC provided a set of recommendations for corrective 
action to Confecciones Mazara management. With respect to the issue of blacklisting, the 
WRC’s principal recommendation was that the company invite the blacklisted workers to 
apply again and provide them with right of first refusal for any open positions and that 
this process be monitored in such a manner as to eliminate, or dramatically reduce, the 
discretion of factory management in making their hiring decisions. In cases in which a 
company has a demonstrated clear intention to discriminate against a particular group of 
workers, such discretion is frequently abused to continue discriminatory practices toward 
that group. For this reason, short of simply offering the workers in question jobs, 
preferential hiring is the remedial action we have found to be most effective in cases of 
this type. The WRC also recommended that the company take measures to eliminate 
discriminatory screens in the hiring process going forward.  
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In response to the WRC’s findings and recommendations, Confecciones Mazara has 
maintained the position that no discrimination of any kind has occurred.1 The company 
agreed to one specific step concerning the hiring process: the elimination of a 
requirement that job applicants produce a document known as a constancia from their 
previous employer, something which the former Vaqueros Navarra workers in question 
could not possibly do.2  However, management did not agree to provide the 
recommended preferential hiring to the workers in question. The company insisted that 
the changes made to the hiring process would ensure fairness to all applicants. 
 
Toward the end of achieving some meaningful remediation in the case, the WRC 
communicated to Confecciones Mazara that – while not preferable – it would be 
reasonable for the company to be provided an opportunity to demonstrate its commitment 
to non-discriminatory hiring, with one critical condition: that the Confecciones Mazara 
assure ex-workers of Vaqueros Navarra that it intends to consider applicants in a non-
discriminatory manner going forward. Without such action, there is a very strong 
likelihood that workers who were subjected to discrimination in the past will be reluctant 
to apply again. The WRC asked management to provide a written statement to the 
Human and Labor Rights Commission of the Tehuacán Valley, for circulation to 
potential applicants, making clear that it is committed to fair and non-discriminatory 
hiring practices and encouraging former Vaqueros Navarra workers to seek employment 
at the plant. Factory management rejected this recommendation.  
 
Given the company’s refusal even to provide a letter to reassure previously blacklisted 
workers that they can apply again without fear of further discrimination, the WRC cannot 
report that the company has taken meaningful corrective action with respect to the 
unlawful discrimination identified in this report, nor can we report that they have 
committed in good faith to do so. 
 
The WRC also issued a number of recommendations relating to occupational health and 
safety. Factory management did agree to take the steps recommended in this area, 
although follow-through has not yet been verified.    
 
The WRC has kept Williamson-Dickie fully informed of the WRC’s findings and 
remediation efforts. We are now asking Williamson-Dickie to intervene directly to ensure 






                                                 
1 As a practical matter, the WRC does not consider it essential that a company admit wrongdoing – to issue 
in effect a mea culpa – as part of remediation, so long as the actual steps management takes are sufficient to 
correct the violations in question.   
2 It is common practice for employers to refuse to provide such letters to workers who have been identified 
as unionists. 
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Sources of Evidence 
 
The WRC’s findings are based on the following sources of evidence:  
 
• Interviews with general manager Rodolfo López, legal adviser María Eugenia Herrera 
González, and human resources manager Margarita López of Confecciones Mazara. 
• Interviews with two current production supervisors at the factory, including the 
principal production supervisor. 
• Interviews with twenty-three garment workers who had either applied for work at or 
were current employees of Confecciones Mazara. The interviews were conducted off-
site.  
• An interview with a representative of the FROC-CROC, the union entity which 
officially represents workers at the facility.  
• A physical inspection of the plant in relation to occupational heath and safety issues.  
• Observation of the entrance area of the facility on dates on which hiring has occurred.  
• An onsite review of relevant records, including information pertaining to hiring and 
dismissals at the plant, and a review of other additional relevant documents provided 
to the WRC by workers and local organizations.  
• A review of relevant documents obtained from other sources, including legal 
submissions to the Mexican Labor Court regarding Confecciones Mazara and an 
alleged “blacklist” identifying workers whom employers are advised not to hire due 
to their past union activism. 
• A review of Mexican labor and employment law, with guidance from specialists in 




To understand the alleged violations at Confecciones Mazara in context, it is necessary to 
briefly review labor rights norms in the State of Puebla, Mexico and the events that led 
up to the complaint that triggered this investigation.  
 
Respect for Rights of Association in the State of Puebla 
 
The level of respect for workers’ associational rights in the apparel export sector in the 
State of Puebla is very low. A central problem is rampant government collusion with 
employers to obstruct workers’ exercise of the right to unionize.  
 
A central reality in the Mexican apparel sector is that most major employers sign 
contracts with one of several “official unions.”3  These organizations, which are unions in 
name only, have long-standing historical ties to the Institutional Revolutionary Party 
(PRI), which dominated Mexican politics at the national level for the bulk of the 20th 
                                                 
3 The largest of these organizations are the Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM), the Regional 
Workers Confederation of Mexico (CROM), and the Revolutionary Confederation of Workers and Peasants 
(CROC). 
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century and which retains control of the state government and most municipal 
governments in the State of Puebla. The primary function of these organizations is to do 
the PRI’s political bidding; their secondary function is to help employers prevent 
legitimate worker organizing. The contracts signed between official unions and 
employers – which are typically signed without the knowledge or consent of workers and 
which confer no benefits or rights upon workers beyond what is already guaranteed by 
law – are known as “protection contracts.” They benefit the official unions by providing a 
base of funding through member dues and a base of political support for the PRI (as 
members are often pressured to perform political work on behalf of the party). And they 
benefit the employer by “protecting” management from genuine unionization, as the 
presence of protection contracts makes it impossible in most circumstances for workers to 
exercise their rights to establish independent unions. As part of this system, Local 
Conciliation and Arbitration Boards (JLCAs), which are entities of the state government, 
aid the official unions by using bureaucratic maneuvers to block the registration of 
independent unions and avert legitimate union elections. Although this is a problem 
throughout Mexico, government interference in workers’ exercise of their associational 
rights is particularly common in the State of Puebla. 4  
 
As a result of the official union system, it is virtually impossible for workers to exercise 
the right to organize an independent labor union in the region’s apparel sector. Between 
1989, when an independent union known as SUTIC was dissolved following the 
assassination of its leader, and the year 2001, there was not a single plant in the Puebla 
apparel industry where workers were able to organize an independent union.5 In 2001, 
workers organized an independent union at a factory known today as Mexmode (formerly 
“Kukdong Mexico”). Following a high profile international labor rights campaign and 
compliance assessments by the WRC and other organizations, serious violations at the 
plant – including the mass unlawful dismissal of union supporters – were corrected and 
the union negotiated a collective bargaining agreement providing for substantial 
improvements. To achieve this result, workers had to oust an official union known as the 
FROC-CROC, which had signed a protection contract with the company without 
workers’ knowledge. As documented in the WRC’s report on this case, the JLCA 
maneuvered illegally to block workers’ petition to replace the official union.6 The 
government’s intervention was only overcome through massive international pressure. 
The Mexmode factory remains, to date, the only independently unionized apparel export 
plant in the State of Puebla. However, as documented in a recent WRC follow-up report, 
                                                 
4 The Government of Puebla has been repeatedly criticized by international bodies, including the ILO 
Committee on Freedom of Association and the U.S. Department of Labor, for violations of workers’ 
freedom of association. See U. S. Department of Labor, Public Report of Review of NAO Submission No. 
2003-01 (PUEBLA), http://www.dol.gov/ilab/media/reports/nao/pubrep2003-1.htm; ILO Committee on 
Freedom of Association, Report No. 334, Case No. 2282 (Matamoros Garment); ILO Committee on 
Freedom of Association, Report No. 337, Case No. 2346 (Tarrant). 
5 “Tehuacán: del calzón de manta a los blue jeans,” Martín Amaru Barrios Hernández and Rodrigo 
Santiago Hernández, Human and Labor Rights Commission of the Tehuacán Valley in collaboration with 
the Maquila Solidarity Network, 2003. 
6 Worker Rights Consortium, Assessment re Complaint Against Kukdong (Mexico), Report and 
Recommendations, June 20, 2001. 
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the government of Puebla has recently intervened again unlawfully in the affairs of the 
union,7 jeopardizing the progress that has been achieved at this factory.  
 
Under these circumstances, collective worker grievances regarding labor abuses in the 
Tehuacán apparel sector, rather than being channeled into a functional industrial relations 
process, have generally only found expression through spontaneous worker protests or 
individual legal complaints. According to Human and Labor Rights Commission of the 
Tehuacán Valley, there have been more than a dozen cases in recent years where workers 
have protested violations such as non-payment of the minimum wage, child labor, and 
unlawful dismissals and have submitted complaints to the local Labor Boards, but where 
no effective government enforcement action was ever taken.8    
 
In those rare cases where workers have overcome the obstacles and succeeded in 
organizing independent labor unions, a last resort of employers opposing such efforts has 
been to shut down the factory in question. Since 2001, there have been three high profile 
cases in the Puebla apparel sector in which workers have organized independent unions, 
or come close to doing so. In each of these cases, management responded by closing the 
facility without notice and dismissing the workforce en masse.  The WRC conducted an 
investigation concerning of one of these plants, Tarrant Ajalpan, in 2003.9 In that case, 
the parent company – U.S. based Tarrant Apparel Group – closed the facility, dismissing 
roughly 1000 workers, shortly after the overwhelming majority of the plant’s workers 
had signed documents supporting the creation of an independent union and had made 
progress toward securing the necessary legal status. The present report concerns the 
alleged blacklisting of workers who had sought to organize an independent union at 
another factory in the region, Vaqueros Navarra, which was shut down shortly after 
workers won a union election.  
 
Grupo Navarra and the Unionization and Closure of Vaqueros Navarra 
 
Because the issues of concern at the Confecciones Mazara plant are closely related to 
events at the Vaqueros Navarra plant, and because the plants themselves are closely 
related, we provide here some brief background information concerning the two factories 
and a brief review of the events preceding our inquiry.  
 
Both Confecciones Mazara and Vaqueros Navarra are part of local business consortia that 
are owned by members of the Fernández family, a prominent investment force in the 
regional apparel sector. Vaqueros Navarra is part of a consortium known as Grupo 
Navarra, which is the principal investor in a local network that includes seven assembly 
                                                 
7  Worker Rights Consortium, Assessment re Mexmode S.A. de C.V. (Mexico), Findings and 
Recommendations, July 3, 2008.   
8 “Tehuacán: del calzón de manta a los blue jeans,” Martín Amaru Barrios Hernández and Rodrigo 
Santiago Hernández, Human and Labor Rights Commission of the Tehuacán Valley in collaboration with 
the Maquila Solidarity Network, 2003.   
9 Worker Rights Consortium, Interim Report: WRC Inquiry Into Labor Rights Violations at Tarrant 
Ajalpan, September 15, 2003. 
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plants and two laundry facilities. Confecciones Mazara is part of a smaller network of 
factories known as Grupo Mazara, which includes three apparel assembly plants. The 
principal shareholder of the Vaqueros Navarra plant is Alfonso Fernández. Mr. 
Fernández’s son, Alfonso Fernández Jr., is the principal shareholder of Confecciones 
Mazara.  
 
The events investigated here concern the aftermath of an effort by workers at the 
Vaqueros Navarra plant to exercise their associational rights. In May 2007, workers at 
Vaqueros Navarra initiated a protest campaign concerning the plant’s alleged failure to 
pay all of a legally mandated annual bonus to workers. The protest grew into an effort to 
establish an independent union, which came to enjoy broad support among the workforce. 
On July 11 of that year, workers held a general assembly and submitted paperwork to the 
JLCA as required by Mexican law to establish a labor union and to seek the right to 
represent the workforce in collective bargaining. In doing so, they were supported by the 
Human and Labor Rights Commission of the Tehuacán Valley and an independent union 
federation known as the Authentic Labor Front (FAT). The union was registered as an 
affiliate of the “September 19th” union federation, which is part of the FAT.    
 
Vaqueros Navarra management launched an intense campaign to thwart the workers’ 
independent unionization effort. This campaign, which was documented by a labor rights 
monitor contracted by the factory’s customers, included various forms of harassment and 
intimidation.10 As part of the campaign, the company reportedly carried out a series of 
mass firings disproportionately affecting supporters of the independent union.11  
 
During the same period, the JLCA, acting in customary fashion, dragged its feet in 
processing the independent union’s paperwork. It delayed for a period of months the 
union’s bid for legal registration and the setting of a date for a union election. The 
process was complicated by the role of two official unions. The independent union 
learned in the course of its organizing that the factory had – without workers’ knowledge 
or consent – already signed an agreement with the FROC-CROC. As a result, the 
independent union’s leadership had to petition the JLCA to transfer the formal right to 
bargain on behalf of the workforce from the FROC-CROC to the impendent union. While 
this effort was underway, an additional official union, known as CROM, entered the 
picture and sought the right to represent the workforce.12 In what appeared to be part of 
the company’s strategy to squelch the independent unionization drive, factory 
management facilitated the CROM’s presence in the factory, allowing CROM 
representatives free access to the workforce to recruit workers during working hours, 
                                                 
10 The organization Verité was contracted by brands in the case to conduct an investigation concerning 
these issues. Verité’s findings are summarized in some detail in a public letter to Grupo Navarra from Gap, 
American Eagle Outfitters, and Warnaco, dated October 18, 2007: 
http://en.maquilasolidarity.org/sites/maquilasolidarity.org/files/GrupoNavarraVeritéFindings.pdf. 
11 This was reported by Maquila Solidarity Network (MSN), which monitored developments and advocated 
on behalf of the independent union with brands and other stakeholders.  
12 Official unions in Mexico sometimes compete with one another to represent workers at particular 
enterprises, as occurred in this case, even though the final agreements they reach with employers are 
invariably the same and are of no benefit to workers.  
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while prohibiting the independent union from having the same access. The JLCA 
declined to act on the independent union’s bid to represent the workforce for several 
months on the grounds that it needed to consider the competing claims of the two official 
unions.  
 
A major international campaign on behalf of the workers was launched, coordinated by 
the Canadian advocacy organization Maquila Solidarity Network. The campaign was 
aimed at pressing the company to respect workers’ associational rights by refraining from 
acts of union-related retaliation or interference and at pressing the government to certify 
the independent union and move forward with a fair secret ballot election to determine 
which union would represent the workforce. During this period, three US apparel brands 
that were current or former customers of Grupo Navarra – American Eagle Outfitters, 
Gap Inc., and Warnaco – sent a public letter to the company, outlining the findings of an 
inquiry by the monitoring organization Verité, which concluded that the factory had 
violated workers associational rights, and supporting the organization’s 
recommendations. These recommendations included the cessation of discrimination 
against workers based on their membership in the independent union and non-
interference with workers’ exercise of their associational rights.13  Additionally, these 
three brands, as well as three additional companies – Abercrombie and Fitch, Express, 
and Levi Strauss – sent a public letter to officials of the State of Puebla, calling on the 
government to fix a date for a union election and to conduct the election in a neutral 
location and in a manner such that workers could register their preference without fear of 
retaliation.  
 
Ultimately, a union election did occur on November 23, 2007. The process fell far short 
of basic international standards for such elections: workers were required to declare their 
preference regarding unionization publicly to a panel comprised of factory management, 
government officials, and representatives of the official unions. According to numerous 
reports, prior to the election, workers were told by management that the company would 
be shut down if the independent union won. Despite these threats and the anti-union 
campaign leading up the election, a majority of workers voted in favor of representation 
by the independent September 19th union.14 
 
Several weeks later, in mid-December, the workforce was sent home for the Christmas 
holiday. The factory never reopened. After justifying a delay in reopening the plant by 
citing a supposed lack of raw materials, on January 23, 2008 – two months after the 
election –Vaqueros Navarra management announced it was closing the facility and 
dismissing all employees, effective immediately. The company claimed the closure was 
due to a lack of orders.  However, subsequent to the closure, the Maquila Solidarity 
Network reported that several major brands had stated that they had in fact tried to direct 
orders to the Vaqueros Navarra factory, but had been rebuffed by the parent company. 
                                                 
13 Letter to Grupo Navarra from Gap, American Eagle Outfitters, and Warnaco summarizing Verité’s 
conclusions, October 18, 2007. See the web location of this letter cited above.  
14 The final tally was 263 workers in favor of the September 19 Union, 187 workers in favor of a union tied 
to the CROM confederation, and 3 workers in favor of staying with the FROC CROC union. 
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Since the closure, there has been a prolonged dispute over the payment of severance. At 
the time of the closure, the company announced that it could only afford to pay 50% of 
legally mandated severance. Following a series of demonstrations in the city of Tehuacán 
by workers demanding full payment, the worker group and the company ultimately 
agreed on a settlement in mid-February 2008, whereby the company would pay severance 
in accordance with the law, but with some of the compensation provided in the form of 
the donation of factory machinery to the workers (rather than in cash). However, there 
has since been a dispute over the valuation of the machinery; as of the issuance of this 
report, the matter remains unresolved.  
  
 
Findings, Recommendations, and Status Report Regarding Labor Rights 
Compliance at Confecciones Mazara 
 
1) Freedom of Association: Nondiscrimination in Hiring  
 
Discrimination against workers on the basis of union activity is prohibited by Mexican 
law,15 Convention 87 of the International Labor Organization, and applicable corporate 
codes of conduct.  
 
The WRC concluded that Confecciones Mazara engaged in unlawful discrimination 
against union supporters in hiring decisions, otherwise known as “blacklisting.” This 
conclusion is supported by multiple sources of evidence, each of which is reviewed 
below.  
  
To test the allegation in the complaint received by the WRC that Confecciones Mazara 
was blacklisting applicants who had supported the union at Vaqueros Navarra, the WRC 
examined the cases of twenty former employees of Vaqueros Navarra who had applied 
for work at Confecciones Mazara. We conducted extensive interviews with each of these 
workers concerning their experience with the application process.16 The twenty workers 
were all veteran apparel workers with multiple years in the local industry. They differed 
from other applicants for work at Confecciones Mazara in no material way, except that 
they had supported the unionization effort at Vaqueros Navarra.  
 
Of the twenty union supporters who applied, nineteen were rejected – a rejection rate of 
95%. We sought to compare this rate of rejection to the normal rate of rejection for 
experienced workers applying for work at the Confecciones Mazara plant. However, 
despite requests from the WRC, management failed to produce the data needed to make 
this comparison. In fact, the company claimed that it did not maintain any data 
whatsoever concerning rejected job applicants or the number of applications received.  
 
                                                 
15 Article 123 of the Mexican Constitution; Articles 354-358 of the Federal Labor Law. 
16 A number of these workers were recruited by the WRC to apply for work at Confecciones Mazara to 
ensure a valid test. This is a common method of testing the veracity of discrimination violations.  
Findings, Recommendations, and Status Report 
Re: Confecciones Mazara (Mexico) 
September 11, 2008 
 
 11
The company did provide the WRC with limited data on the number of workers hired 
during the three months preceding the WRC’s on-site meeting with management. 
However, this information was falsified before it was provided to the WRC in written 
form. Management originally showed the WRC investigators a document containing the 
data; investigators examined it and then asked for a copy. Several hours later, after an 
extensive discussion between the investigators and management concerning the subject of 
alleged discrimination in hiring decisions, a document was provided to the investigators 
which was ostensibly the one previously shown to them, but which in fact differed 
dramatically.17 The new information was contradicted by a representative of the pro-
management official union and by workers interviewed by the WRC investigators.  
 
Factory management has an obligation to produce accurate data necessary to assess labor 
standards compliance. In this case, it failed to do so. The WRC thus could not compare 
the rejection rate for the union supporters noted above with the rate at which experienced 
applicants are normally rejected. While the 95% rejection rate for the union supporters is 
strikingly high in absolute terms, in the absence of such a basis for comparison, the WRC 
did not consider it to be conclusive evidence of discrimination.  
 
The WRC therefore turned to an examination of the specific experiences of the twenty 
job applicants when they sought work at the factory. The WRC found that the factory 
subjected these job applicants to a series of screening mechanisms that had a clear 
discriminatory effect. These screening mechanisms included requiring that workers 
produce a document known as a “constancia” (a letter from their previous employer 
attesting to their prior employment status), something most trade unionists would be in no 
position to provide; asking workers verbally if they had been employed at Vaqueros 
Navarra; and comparing applicants’ names against those appearing on actual blacklist.   
 
It bears noting that different workers were subjected to different screening mechanisms 
(or combinations of mechanisms). This is not surprising given that different supervisors 
were in charge on different days, that the applicants in question applied over a period of 
more than six weeks, and that the factory’s overall hiring procedure was not administered 
in a consistent manner, something that was clear from interviews with managers and 
supervisors at the facility.  
 
Below we describe in more depth the screening mechanisms used to eliminate applicants 
perceived to be trade unionists: 
 
                                                 
17 Upon requesting the information during the on-site audit, the company initially showed the WRC a list of 
employee names indicating that roughly 25 workers were hired during the month of April. However, the 
document ultimately provided listed only 11 workers as having been hired during that month – a figure that 
was contradicted not only by the document originally presented by management, but by credible 
information from other sources. 
Findings, Recommendations, and Status Report 
Re: Confecciones Mazara (Mexico) 
September 11, 2008 
 
 12
1) A number of the workers applying at Confecciones Navarra were required to produce 
a constancia as a condition of being considered for employment.18 As explained 
earlier, a constancia is a document that employers generally provide to workers upon 
their departure from a job, confirming that they were employed at the enterprise.19 
Relevant to this case, Vaqueros Navarra declined to provide any of the independent 
union’s supporters with the document upon their dismissal in February 2008. It is 
common practice in Mexico, and in other countries in Latin America, for employers 
to refuse to provide constancias to unionists when they leave employment and to 
demand constancias from new job applicants – it is an effective means of keeping 
trade unionists out of the industry. 
 
At Confecciones Mazara, most of the applicants were required to produce the 
constancia at the outset of the application process, immediately upon presenting 
themselves at the factory. Because they could not produce the document, their 
applications were not considered. In the case of a smaller number of workers, 
management did not initially request the constancia and proceeded to hire the 
workers. However, during their first day on the production lines, these workers were 
summoned by management and asked to produce the constancia. When they could 
not do so, they were dismissed.  
 
It bears noting that, in interviews with the WRC investigators, senior factory 
management acknowledged the discriminatory effect of a constancia requirement. 
Indeed, the senior managers initially claimed that the factory did not impose such a 
requirement and that the purpose of this was to avoid potential discrimination. 
However, senior management’s denial that the constancia requirement existed was 
belied not only by the testimony of the numerous workers who were required to 
produce the document, but by the testimony of the senior supervisor at the factory in 
charge of the hiring process. This individual openly acknowledged that workers are 
required to produce the document when they apply. After being presented with the 
WRC’s findings, senior management acknowledged that the company was indeed 
requiring constancias at the time the former Vaqueros Navarra workers were 
applying. 
 
2) An additional means by which Confecciones Mazara screened out union supporters 
from the hiring process was by simply rejecting applicants solely on the sole grounds 
that they had been employed at Vaqueros Navarra.   
 
                                                 
18 It bears noting that management typically referred to these documents as “letters of recommendation” in 
the context of conversations with workers and with the WRC.  However, the documents are not in fact 
letters of recommendations, but simply documents stating a worker’s start and end date of employment.  
Because these documents are generally referred to as constancias, not letters of recommendation, for the 
purposes of clarity we have referred to them as constancias throughout this report.  
19 Note that such documents typically state only that an employee worked for a company for a given period 
and do not make any reference to their performance.  In this case, some workers were requested to produce 
a “letter of good conduct” from their previous employer, in addition to the constancia.  
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A number of union supporters interviewed testified that immediately upon applying 
for work at the Confecciones Mazara plant, they were asked where they had worked 
previously. When they responded “Vaqueros Navarra,” they were told that they 
would not be considered for employment. There was no legitimate basis to exclude 
applicants solely on the basis of their past place of employment. The only conceivable 
purpose for this exclusion was to ensure that “troublemakers” from Vaqueros Navarra 
were not hired.  
 
3) The third screening mechanism used by Confecciones Mazara was to check the 
names of applicants against a list of workers it had in its possession. The WRC was 
able to determine that this was an actual blacklist: a list of names of workers viewed 
as troublemakers, circulated among factory owners.   
 
The WRC gathered credible testimony that factory management has relied on such a 
list to identify and exclude members of the September 19th union from employment. 
A number of workers reported that when they were asked by Mazara managers where 
they had worked previously, and they replied that they had worked at Vaqueros 
Navarra, the Mazara managers asked for their names, consulted a list, and then 
informed them that their application would not be considered. The following are 
representative examples of experiences described by workers in testimony to the 
WRC.   
 
• One worker sought to apply for work at the plant on March 11, 2008.  When she 
arrived at the front gate, she asked a company security guard if the company was 
hiring. The guard told her yes, and then asked her about her previous employer. 
The worker said she had been employed at Vaqueros Navarra. The officer then 
asked for her name and made a phone to call the factory’s payroll secretary. 
Shortly after, the secretary came outside and said that “there was no work for the 
troublemakers of September 19th.”  The worker had not previously identified 
herself as a member of the September 19th union.  
 
• Another worker sought to apply for work on April 2, 2008. Once inside the 
factory, a human resources manager asked him where he had worked previously.  
When he said “Vaqueros Navarra,” the manager took out a long list of names and 
searched for the worker’s name. The worker was able to observe his name on the 
third page. The manager then asked for the worker’s identification documents, 
went to a computer very briefly, and then told the worker that no position was 
available for which he was qualified. The worker had not at this point indicated 
what kind of position he was seeking nor provided any information about his 
qualifications.  
 
• Another worker sought to apply for work on April 14, 2008. After completing 
paperwork for the application and handing it to the human resources manager, the 
manager asked her where she had worked previously. The worker responded, 
“Vaqueros Navarra..” The manager then took out a list of names. After finding the 
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worker’s name on the list, the manager told the worker that if she had a 
constancia, she could be given work, but there was no job for her if she could not 
produce one.  
 
The WRC was ultimately able to obtain a copy of one iteration of this blacklist 
(which is unusual, since these documents are generally closely guarded by factory 
managers). The WRC obtained the document from the Human and Labor Rights 
Commission of the Tehuacán Valley, which reported that it had obtained the list from 
a former Vaqueros Navarra worker, who had in turn obtained it from a personal 
friend who has been a supervisor at a third factory. The document is five-pages in 
length and is titled: “Lista de personal no recomendable para proporcionar empleo” 
(List of Workers Not Recommended for Hire). Below the title, which is typed, 
appears the following handwritten text: “Grupo Navarra; Dic/07; Afiliados a Martin 
Barrios” (Grupo Navarra, December 07, Affiliates of Martin Barrios). Martin Barrios 
is the head of the afore-mentioned Human and Labor Rights Commission.  His 
organization, and he personally, played a leading role in supporting the September 
19th union and he has been a vocal critic of labor rights abuses in the region. He is 
viewed by factory owners and managers as a union “ringleader.” The rest of the 
document is an alphabetical listing of 551 names. Leaders of the September 19th 
union reported to the WRC that most of the individuals listed are members of the 
union or workers who have been involved in other protest campaigns supported by 
the Commission.   
 
As noted above, the twenty workers who applied at Confecciones Mazara had varying 
experiences in the application process, in terms of the screening mechanisms that were 
utilized (some were asked for a constancia immediately upon applying, some were not 
asked for a constancia but had their names checked against a list, some were asked for a 
constancia – and then dismissed – only after being hired, etc.). Overall, of the twenty 
applicants in question, nineteen were subjected to one or more of the screening 
mechanisms described above.20  The one applicant who was not subjected to any of the 






                                                 
20 Note that in some cases, one screening mechanism was a trigger for another.  For example, in some 
cases, when a worker was asked where he or she had worked previously and he or she replied “Vaqueros 
Navarra,” the manager then required that the worker produce a constancia from the company. 
21 This worker was hired at the beginning of April, soon after the closure of Vaqueros Navarra. On the day 
the worker applied, two other former Vaqueros Navarra workers also applied. Those two workers were 
asked to produce the constancia and were denied employment on the basis of their failure to do so. In the 
case of the worker who was hired, management did not ask for a constancia, did not ask about the worker’s 
previous place of employment, and did not check the worker’s name against a blacklist. The worker did not 
have a constancia to produce and his name appears on the blacklist document obtained by the WRC.   
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In addition to the evidence reviewed above demonstrating that management used 
screening mechanisms that had the effect of ruling out union supporters, the WRC 
received testimony from workers concerning incriminating statements by managers to the 
effect that the screening mechanisms were designed for the express purpose of 
discriminating against unionists.  
 
With respect to the constancia requirement, for example, one worker testified that upon 
applying for work, a human resources manager asked her where she had worked 
previously. When she replied “Vaqueros Navarra,” the manager asked her for a 
constancia.  The worker replied that she did not have one.  According to the worker’s 
testimony, the manager then told her, “For now we can’t give you a job, because they 
give letters of recommendation (by which the manager meant constancias) to everyone at 
Vaqueros Navarra, except those that behaved badly.”  The worker replied that she had not 
behaved badly. The manager responded by saying that the company was asking for the 
letters because there was a conflict at Vaqueros Navarra created by a group of 
troublemakers, and that workers who left on good terms have constancias.  
 
One worker, who was initially hired by the factory at the end of March 2008 and then 
fired on her first day of work, provided particularly revealing testimony. During her first 
and only day working on the production floor, a supervisor approached her and asked her 
which factory she had worked in previously. When the worker told him it was Vaqueros 
Navarra, the supervisor replied, “We’ll see if you’re not dismissed, because the company 
does not hire people from the September 19th union.” Later in the day, the worker was 
dismissed. 
 
The WRC also interviewed current employees of Confecciones Mazara. Several of these 
workers testified that managers had instructed workers that they should not be seen in the 
community associating with workers from Vaqueros Navarra.  A worker testified that the 
human resources manager told workers in a meeting that if they wanted to keep their job, 
they should stay clear of anyone associated with the September 19th union and that 
anyone seen associating with such people would be punished.  
 
In sum, the very high rate of rejection experienced by union supporters who applied for 
work at Confecciones Mazara, management’s use of discriminatory screening 
mechanisms in the hiring process, and statements by management revealing the factory’s 
intent to discriminate against union supporters, constitute overwhelming evidence of 




The WRC issued the following recommendations to Confecciones Mazara management 
with respect to the issue of hiring discrimination:  
 
• Provide hiring opportunities to former workers of the Vaqueros Navarra facility on a 
preferential basis for any newly open positions in order to correct for past 
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discrimination. This means that workers who were employed by Vaqueros Navarra 
should be hired ahead of any other qualified applicant for available positions. In 
executing this process, the company should communicate with former Vaqueros 
Navarra workers to inform them that the company is hiring and inform them of the 
positions that the company is seeking to fill. The hiring process with respect to these 
workers should be monitored.  
 
• Cease discrimination in the overall hiring process. Ensure that all factory personnel 
who interact with job applicants fully understand the company’s position in this 
regard.   
 
• Specifically, cease requiring that workers provide constancias from their previous 




In response to the findings and recommendations outlined above, Confecciones Mazara 
management denied that it has discriminated against any employees from Vaqueros 
Navarra in hiring decisions. The company did not agree to provide preferential hiring 
opportunities to the former Vaqueros Navarra workers. The company did agree to end the 
practice of requiring workers to provide constancias as a condition of being hired and to 
consider all applicants solely on the basis of their qualifications and abilities.  
 
While the WRC strongly preferred that the company commit to preferential hiring, we 
believed as a practical matter, given the company’s posture, that it would be reasonable to 
provide the company with an opportunity to demonstrate its commitment to non-
discriminatory hiring going forward, with one critical condition: that the company assure 
ex-workers of Vaqueros Navarra that it intends to consider their applications in a non-
discriminatory fashion. For the company’s commitment to non-discriminatory practices 
to be meaningfully tested, it is necessary that former workers from Vaqueros Navarra 
seek employment again at the plant. Without any explicit communication along these 
lines, there is a substantial likelihood that workers who were subjected to discrimination 
in the past will be reluctant to apply again. For this reason, the WRC asked management 
to provide a letter to the Human and Labor Rights Commission of the Tehuacán Valley,22 
for circulation to potential applicants, making clear its commitments to fair and non-
discriminatory hiring practices and encouraging former Vaqueros Navarra workers to 
seek employment.  
 
Factory management has refused to issue the letter to workers. In response to the WRC’s 
recommendation, the company instead sent two letters to the state government stating 
that it intends to obey the law. These letters did not encourage former Vaqueros Navarra 
workers to apply or reference these workers in any way. They are therefore of no value as 
                                                 
22 The Human and Labor Rights Commission is in ongoing contact with many of the former Vaqueros 
Navarra workers.  
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a means to communicate the necessary reassurance to workers who were blacklisted and 
might consider re-applying. The WRC asked the company a second time to issue a letter 
to workers and the company replied by stating its refusal to do so. 
 
In view of the company’s refusal even to provide a letter to reassure previously 
blacklisted workers that they can apply again without fear of further discrimination, the 
WRC cannot report that the company has taken meaningful corrective action with respect 
to the unlawful discrimination identified in this report, nor can we report that they have 
committed in good faith to do so. 
  
As noted in the introduction, the WRC has kept Williamson-Dickie fully informed of the 
WRC’s findings and remediation efforts. We are now asking Williamson-Dickie to 
intervene directly on the blacklisting issue to ensure that full remediation occurs in this 
case. 
 
2) Occupational Health and Safety 
 
The WRC’s investigators conducted a physical inspection of the factory to review 
occupational health and safety (OHS) conditions and practices. The following problems 
were identified:  
 
• Lack of needle guards on sewing machines: Mexican law requires that employers 
ensure that machinery used by employees is fitted with safety devices necessary to 
ensure safe operation.23 A basic safety provision required for safe operation of sewing 
machines is the use of needle guards, which protect against laceration of workers’ 
fingers as they pass cloth under the needle. The WRC’s inspection found that many of 
the sewing machines used by workers lacked needle guards. Factory management 
acknowledged the problem, but claimed the machines were at one point fitted with 
guards and that workers themselves had removed them. Whether or not this is true, 
such protective equipment is essential for workers’ safety and the company has an 
obligation to replace in a timely fashion any guards that are damaged or removed. 
 
• Unhygienic conditions in factory restrooms: Mexican law requires that employers 
provide workers with clean, hygienic restroom facilities.24 The factory had one 
restroom for men and one restroom for women, for a total of 490 workers. The 
inspection found the facilities to be unclean and in poor condition, with a noxious 
odor strong enough that it could be detected in the hallway leading to the restrooms. 
A worker was sent to clean the restrooms just as the inspectors were reviewing the 
plant. However, there was no indication that regular cleaning was carried out; 
management acknowledged that it did not maintain any cleaning log.  
 
                                                 
23 Article 36 of the Federal Regulation of Security, Hygiene, and Environment in the Workplace.  
24 Article 13, 103, and 106 of the Federal Regulation of Security, Hygiene, and Environment in the 
Workplace. 
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• Lack of clearly marked first aid kits in the production area: Mexican law requires that 
employers provide first aid kits with materials adequate to provide emergency aid.25 
In the inspection of the production area it was noted that while the factory had first 
aid kits, they were not visibly marked and no information was posted in the factory 
regarding means of accessing first aid in the case of an emergency. 
 
• Accident Log: Mexican law requires that employers maintain a log of all workplace 
accidents.26 When asked during the on-site inspection to provide the accident log to 
the WRC investigators, management stated that it does not maintain a log. However, 
when subsequently informed of the WRC’s findings, Confecciones Mazara stated that 
there had been a miscommunication with the managers with whom the investigators 
met during the site visit and that the company does in fact maintain an accident log. 
In response to a request from the WRC, the company sent a sample of the company’s 





The WRC issued the following recommendations to Confecciones Mazara management 
with respect to issues of occupational health and safety:  
 
• Install needle guards on all sewing machines in the plant. Adopt a policy that the use 
of such protective equipment is mandatory at the plant. Regularly inspect the 
machines to ensure that the guards have not been removed.  
 
• Ensure that the facility’s restrooms are clean and stocked with towels and toilet paper 
at all times. To accomplish this, we recommend that the facilities be cleaned and 
replenished at least twice daily. A log registering the time of each cleaning should be 
kept at the factory, visible to all personnel and available to monitors. 
 
• Ensure that first aid kits are installed at well-marked locations in all of the production 
areas. Implement a system whereby designated workers are charged with maintaining 
the kits at all times. Provide training to these individuals to ensure they are capable of 
carrying out this function. Post notices at the first aid kits identifying the persons 






                                                 
25 Article 148 of the Federal Regulation of Security, Hygiene, and Environment in the Workplace. 
26 Article 127 and 128 of the Federal Regulation of Security, Hygiene, and Environment in the Workplace.  
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Management provided the following responses to the recommendations outlined above: 
 
• On the issue of needle guards, factory management committed to providing needle 
guards on all sewing machines. (It also continued to insist that workers had removed 
the guards and stated it will implement an educational and disciplinary program to 
ensure that that the guards are not removed again.)  
 
• On the issue of restroom hygiene, factory management committed to implement a 
new maintenance and cleaning program for the factory’s restrooms. This will include 
a log recording each cleaning of the facilities.  
 
• On the issue of first aid, management claimed that it maintains first aid kits in the 
production area.  It stated it will implement an educational program on their use and 
on that of the factory’s medical clinic. Management stated that the medical clinic will 
provide workers with daily medical consultation by a medical doctor and nurse.  
 
 
